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«Lies, damned lies and criminal statistics»: 
Reinterpreting 
the criminal statistics in England and Wales 
Robert M. Morris 1 
Ce qu'on est en droit de tirer des statistiques pénales établies en 
Angleterre et Galles, depuis leur création en 1803, n'a pas soulevé un grand 
intérêt, ni controverse, parmi les historiens. Bien que les défauts de ces 
données soient bien connus, on a eu tendance à s'accorder pour les utiliser 
pour comprendre les phénomènes que, de l'avis général, elles visaient à 
représenter. En se fondant sur des sources publiées, le Dr. Howard Taylor a 
remis en cause ce consensus et a proposé une relecture des données sur un 
siècle, jusqu'en 1960. Il soutient qu'on ne peut pas considérer ces données 
comme une production, certes défectueuse, mais réalisée de bonne foi; il y 
voit au contraire une entreprise délibérée visant à dissimuler le véritable 
niveau de la criminalité, meurtres compris. En analysant les données dans 
une perspective de l'offre, il affirme qu'à certaines périodes, on a cherché à 
atteindre ce but par un sous-enregistrement, une pénurie budgétaire organi-
sée, et en jouant sur les poursuites. 
Le présent article soutient que l'argumentation du Dr. Taylor fait trop 
peu de place au caractère décentralisé et émietté des politiques et des pra-
tiques pénales; qu'elle attribue trop de signification à des phénomènes sta-
tistiques fortuits; et qu'elle voit à tort, un projet prémédité là où n'existait 
pas la capacité d'en contrôler le résultat que l'on peut, du reste, convenable-
ment expliquer d'une autre façon. 
What legitimately to conclude from government statistics relating to the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales since their inception from 1803 
has provoked neither great interest nor much controversy amongst histori-
ans. Although the defects of the data are well known, there has been a ten-
dency to settle for using the data as a basis for coming to an understanding of 
the phenomena they were accepted as setting out to chart. Relying on pub-
lished sources, Dr Howard Taylor has challenged this consensus by offering 
a new reading of the data in the century up to 1960. He argues that the data 
represent not simply flawed though essentially bona fide product but, on the 
contrary, conscious attempts to mask the suppression of the real levels of 
criminality, including murder. Approaching the data from a supply side per-
spective, he claims these ends were furthered at times by under-recording, by 
consciously ungenerous funding, and by manipulating prosecution practice. 
R.M. Morris studied History at Cambridge and worked as an administrator in the Home Office 1961-
97, including on police, prisons and criminal justice issues. He is currently engaged (under Professor 
Clive Emsley at the Open University, UK) on a doctoral study of the London Metropolitan police 
1860-1920. A version of the paper was originally given at the Seminar «Questions de 
polices/Policing Matters» (GERN-CNRS), Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, 10-11 
December, 1999. 
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It is contended that Dr Taylor's arguments allow insufficiently for the decen-
tralised and disaggregated character of criminal justice policy and practice, 
exaggerate the significance of adventitious statistical phenomena, and mis-
takenly attribute premeditated design for outcomes there was both no capac-
ity to encompass and for which there are adequate alternative explanations. 
This paper responds to a series of recent articles by Dr Howard Taylor2 in which he has, single-handedly, revitalised the approach to unravelling the 
historical significance of data published in the Criminal Statistics for England and 
Wales 3. Broadly, he has maintained that the outputs of the criminal justice system 
from the 1850s to the 1960s were consciously manipulated by the executive and its 
agencies to misrepresent the true incidence of crime. 
The paper adopts two strategies - the first general and contextual, and the second 
to engage directly with Howard Taylor's arguments. The first is a necessary prelimi-
nary to establish the essential operating background to criminal justice policy devel-
opment in the last 150 years. Unless that is done, discussion cannot comprehensibly 
identify what is, and what is not, significant in interpreting the data under review. 
I. THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
Central and local government in England and Wales 
At the outset it should be understood that England and Wales falls to be viewed 
as a discrete entity within the United Kingdom (UK). Despite the existence of pow-
erful UK-wide institutions such as the monarchy and the Westminster Parliament, 
the UK is a union as opposed to a unitary state. Administratively, it consists of three 
distinct parts viz. Northern Ireland (and, until 1922, the whole of the island of 
Ireland), Scotland, and England and Wales. Although devolution has given assem-
blies and executives of varying kinds to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, for 
criminal justice purposes England and Wales continues as a single unit. It follows 
that the separate operations of the criminal justice systems within the UK have never 
been treated statistically as a single unit. Although there was some initiative in that 
direction in the nineteenth century, it did not prosper 4. 
In addition, one of the cardinal facts to be borne in mind in approaching histori-
cal accounts of criminal justice in England and Wales is the extent to which its deliv-
ery was locally organised, locally financed and locally run until very recent times. 
Indeed, in many of its current aspects the delivery of criminal justice is still a local 
affair: 96% of all criminal cases are disposed of by magistrates' courts where 30 000 
lay, and a small band of stipendiary, magistrates sit in locally run and partly locally 
financed courts (in their administrative capacity, magistrates controlled county gov-
2
 Taylor (1998a, 1998b and 1999). 
3
 The principal examples of modern historical accounts are perhaps Gatrell and Hadden (1972), 
Gatrell (1980) and Radzinowicz and Hood (1986, pp. 91-112). The same ground is more accessibly 
covered in Emsley (1997). 
4
 Official Statistics Committee (1881), memorandum of November 1876 by Robert Giffen, head of 
statistics in the Board of Trade, which amongst other things excoriated (p. 97) the Home Office 
Judicial, Prison and other related statistics as containing «duplicate and superfluous matter». 
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ernment until 1888, and the fact that they for long shared the social background of 
the legislators - and, as well as being frequently related, were often actually the 
same people - meant that Parliament did not lack sympathy for the local perspec-
tive). 
The higher criminal courts were nationalised only as recently as the Courts Act 
1971. There are 43 police forces which are now all accountable to local police 
authorities. For long the sole exception - the Metropolitan police which since incep-
tion in 1829 has been answerable solely to (and subject to the orders of) a minister, 
the Home Secretary - has become answerable to a new police authority following 
the creation of the new Greater London Authority in 2000. Apart from the limited 
remit of the Director of Public Prosecutions originating in 1879, there was no 
national system of public prosecution operating until 1986 (under the Prosecution of 
Offenders Act 1985). Even then, no state monopoly of prosecution was created 
because the way was still left open for private prosecutions in addition to those 
undertaken by a considerable range of statutory bodies. 
At the same time, of course, the role of central authority should not be dis-
counted. Royal judges have been circumambulatory since the early twelfth century. 
Since 1833 government has contributed on an increasing scale to the costs of local 
justice in respect, first, of policing costs (until 1856 in London only) and, secondly, 
from 1835 of prosecution costs. Throughout, government appointed all the judges in 
the senior courts and controlled the system which appointed the magistrates. In more 
recent times, government has embarked on financial control policies which have 
imposed monetary ceilings on local expenditure, and successive Acts in 1991 
(Criminal Justice Act) and 1994 (Police and Magistrates' Courts Act) have, for 
example, imposed cash limits on the permitted annual expenditure of magistrates' 
courts, and of the police and probation services. 
The government has also throughout usually been the dominant partner in 
achieving systemic change by means of statutory enactment, for example in adjust-
ing the powers of the criminal courts 5. Successive statutes, particularly from 1855, 
redistributed business downwards from the upper courts to the magistrates' courts 
by allowing certain kinds of indictable offences to be triable summarily in the lower 
courts rather than in the upper courts alone. In contrast, the powers of the police 
received relatively less legislative attention until very recent times, largely because 
they were left for long subjected to the common law and judicial oversight rather 
than statutory regulation. But nineteenth century governments did not necessarily 
sweep all before them and always get their way. The Constabulary Act 1856 was 
preceded by the rejection of Palmerston's attempt to legislate on the same subject. 
Conversely, in 1863 the Home Secretary (Grey) was unable to dissuade Parliament 
from passing Adderley's Security from Violence Bill 6. 
Accustomed as the UK is in present times to a Parliament where the executive 
and government legislation dominate, it takes a special effort perhaps to recall that 
the principal reason why prosecution practice was not modernised lay in the absence 
throughout the Victorian period (and for some time afterwards) of a workable, 
At the same time it has to be borne in mind that private for long outnumbered public legislation in 
the UK Parliament. For example, it has been calculated that during 1800-1884 there were 18 497 
private as opposed to 9556 public statutes. See Prest (1990, p.4). 
The Bill introduced flogging for «garotters», and was memorably castigated by Grey as « a panic 
measure after the panic had subsided», Official Report, Commons, 11 March 1863, col. 1311. 
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abiding consensus in Parliament about what should be the basis of reform which did 
not increase the reach of government patronage. As Maitland put it : «It became the 
mark of enlightenment to demand the immediate creation of a complete system of 
public prosecutors; but beyond this demand there was extremely little agreement» 7. 
The fact that recent governments have been perceived as, and criticised for, fol-
lowing policies of centralisation is itself an indication of the persistence of localised 
forms of criminal justice administration8. This is not of merely wishful or partisan 
retrospection : it underlines the need to appreciate the real and pervading distance 
between central and local decision making for practically the whole of the period 
effectively under discussion. Whilst policing outside London would not have 
assumed a common form and coverage when it did had not the government agreed 
after an earlier failure of legislation based on the Report of the Select Committee of 
1852-1853 to contribute one quarter of the costs from 1856, the system established 
was essentially a locally controlled one in the shires as it remained in the boroughs 
- where the borough police authorities insisted on keeping the greater degree of 
influence over operational matters that the original 1835 legislation had given them 
as opposed to that available in the shires from 1839 9. 
The fact that the UK is a relatively small landmass does not mean that centrali-
sation was inevitable. On the contrary, its relative inviolability behind what was for 
long a challenging moat meant that central government did not have to insist on 
administrative forms wholly under its control. In addition, before the cumulative 
effects of extending the suffrage, there was - as already indicated above - a good 
deal of common view between the office-holders at the centre and those in the local-
ities : the men who participated in national politics were essentially at one with - and 
not infrequently the same as - those who led local political life 1 0. In Ireland, the 
same conditions did not exist under the rule of an alien protestant Ascendancy and, 
as a result, different forms developed - notably, centrally controlled police forces, 
prosecution control by a single professional authority, and a largely stipendiary 
magistracy. 
The development of the statistical series 
The development falls into five phases, of which the first four have been amply 
described before 1 1. The fifth commenced in 1981 with the inauguration of the crime 
surveys i.e. national surveys of victims' experience of crime. 
7
 Maitland (1885, p. 148). 
8
 The rejection on 20 January 2000 by the House of Lords of the government's Criminal Justice (Mode 
of Trial) Bill (which extended changes initiated in principle by the Criminal Justice Act 1855 and would 
have further qualified the right of defendants to opt for jury trial) may be seen to represent, among other 
things, the outcome of continuing tensions between centre and locality in the administration of crimi-
nal justice in England and Wales. In Scotland defendants have never had any such rights in a system 
where the mode of trial is fixed by the Procurator Fiscal, that is the public prosecutor. 
9
 Described as «the institution of a centralised police force », an unusual misdescription in the com-
pendious and thoughtful meditation on the criminal statistics, policing and social change in Gatrell 
(1980, p. 259). The most recent account of the decades before the 1856 Act pays particular attention 
to the political background: Philips, Storch (1999). 
1 0
 It has been pointed out that one of the principal reasons why magisterial rule in the English and 
Welsh counties lasted so long (i.e. until 1888) was because of « the reluctance of MPs to sanction an 
assault on their own class » - Dunbabin (1977, p.779). 
1 1
 See note 3 above. 
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In practice, Howard Taylor is concerned with the third and fourth phases. These 
originated in reforms respectively of 1857 and 1893. That of 1857 (under the direc-
tion of the Home Office official, Samuel Redgrave) inaugurated the publication of 
offences whose commission came to the attention of the police, an initiative made 
possible only by the Police Act of the previous year. The 1893 reform divorced the 
criminal and judicial statistics into separate series, dropped some of the less worthy 
material, and tightened up the counting rules to produce more uniformity of report-
ing amongst the nearly 200 separate police forces. Thereafter, the annual series 
increasingly became the base for more detailed individual studies and were comple-
mented by additional series e.g. on probation and road traffic. Although now more 
sophisticated, and complemented also by the crime surveys, it is essentially this 
system that persists in the annual publications of today. 
Perfection was not reached in 1893 or subsequently, nor did contemporaries 
claim otherwise. As has been observed: 
It is not sufficiently appreciated by modem students of criminal statistics that all 
the major limitations of this source had already been perceived and expressed 
with force and clarity by nineteenth century inquirers12. 
To what extent was the reformed data of better quality ? In his preface to the 
1894 Statistics, Troup, the Home Office official responsible for completing the 1893 
reform, discussed and showed full awareness of the stratagems available to, and 
used by, the police in their recording and reporting practices : 
The figures showing the numbers of crimes and consequently the proportions 
must be taken with a great deal of caution. The returns of the numbers of crimes 
committed depend to a considerable extent on the discretion of the police ; they 
are not certain and definite figures in the same way as the numbers of prosecu-
tions and convictions are certain and definite. 
Going on to explain why the police returns in this case had been re-entitled 
«Crimes known to the police» because the term «Crimes committed » was mis-
leading, he said : 
Not only do the figures fall short of the real number of «crimes committed » by 
the enormous number of unreported or unknown cases ; but there seems much 
reason to think that, though the instructions as the mode of collecting them have 
been made as definite as possible, there is still a tendency on the part of some 
police forces to adopt a very high standard of what constitutes a « crime commit-
ted » or a « crime reported to the police », and by this means further to reduce the 
number of cases entered into this column...No doubt it is natural... that they 
should seek to minimise the amount of unpunished crime existing in their district, 
but such a tendency detracts so much from the value of the returns of crime that it 
almost raises the question whether it worth retaining the returns at all...it should 
be clearly stated that they represent only the crimes known to the police, and do 
not even approach the real total of crime13. 
1 2
 Radzinowicz, Hood (1986, p. 107). 
1 3
 Criminal Statistics 1894 (1896), preface dated 1 May 1896, p. 30 and pp. 34-35. He repeated the 
health warning in the case of the 1895 Statistics even more emphatically: «There is some basis of 
truth in the remark made by an experienced chief constable, the 'amount of crime in a county is a 
matter of book-keeping'» - Criminal Statistics 1895 (1897), preface of 6 February 1897, p. 35. 
Exactly the same point has been made with a wealth of contemporary detail in a modern police 
account - see Young (1991), for example pp. 377-381. 
116 ROBERT M, MORRIS 
His understanding preceded what is usually regarded as its classic statement in 
the criminological literature by 70 years 1 4. 
Throughout efforts have continued to be made to develop standardised recording 
practices. Troup gave much early attention to the problem which was particularly 
intractable when there were well over 100 separate police forces. The problems con-
tinued and were the cause of a Home Office initiative in 1929 to investigate « what 
is behind the extraordinary variations between different parts of England and Wales, 
and even between different Divisions in the Metropolitan Police District » 1 5 . 
Subsequent attempts were made to improve the quality of the data. For example, the 
Perks Committee undertook a thorough view during the 1960s. There have been 
continuing exchanges since between the Home Office's now thoroughly profession-
alised statistical services and the police, and important developments in the count-
ing rules whose effect will be to give a clearer account of the victim's experience and 
allow greater comparability between notifiable offences recorded by the police and 
the product of the victim surveys 1 6. More recently still, Home Office Ministers have 
been prepared to accept the recommendations of a study by the Inspectorate of 
Constabulary concerned with the accuracy of police recording of crime and which 
could result in raising recorded crime figures by as much as a quarter 1 7. 
II. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Historians and the criminal statistics 
Historians have come late to crime, and it is only in the last three decades that 
they have shown any considerable interest in crime phenomena. In another sense, of 
course, they will always come late because their interest is backward looking. It is 
also utterly dependent on pre-existing data in whose construction they cannot have 
had any hand and whose interpretation, like other historical records, is fraught with 
difficulty. It is never enough to look at the data without understanding the motives 
and working methods of their compilers. 
The extent to which historians and the sociologists of deviance seem to have co-
existed in parallel universes has on occasion been striking. Whilst some differences 
of perspective are to be expected where the former operate with retrospection and 
the latter are more preoccupied with explaining the present and predicting the future, 
historians have seemed relatively unfamiliar with the extensive sociological litera-
ture about data sources in which they could be expected to have at least a similar 
interest. Thus, discussion of crime trends has often started and finished with analy-
ses of the criminal statistics, especially those of police recorded crime. This has led 
some sociologists to conclude that «Historians are particularly prone to defer to 
1 4
 Kitsuse, Cicourel (1963), p. 137 «Thus, rates can be viewed as indices of organizational processes 
rather than as indices of certain forms of behaviour». 
1 5
 Minute of 3 May 1929 by Arthur Locke, whom the Home Secretary appointed to chair the commit-
tee set up as a result - HO 329/108-R843/56B. Because of Locke's death, the committee never pro-
duced a formal report, though it was considered that its objects had been achieved in practice. 
1 6
 Perks Report (1967). For recent changes in the counting rules, see Home Office Statistical Bulletin 
18/99. For an illuminating discussion of counting ambiguities in the comparable French system, see 
Aubusson de Cavarlay (1998). 
17
 Times and Guardian reports, 1.8.2000. 
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police and court records as indisputably sound » 1 8 . In their effort to account for 
evident changes in public behaviour during the nineteenth century, they have some-
times leant heavily on the official statistics and have treated them with a respect and 
lack of scepticism, which probably would have surprised Redgrave and Troup. 
Howard Taylor's investigations 
In his recent articles 1 9, Howard Taylor has reinvigorated the debate about crime 
trends by focusing on the supply side of criminal justice from the nineteenth century 
up to the Second World War. Far from showing the criminal statistics unthinking and 
exaggerated respect, he has been properly determined to show them no unearned 
respect at all, and look closely amongst other things at what they reveal about the 
impact of criminal justice services on those affected by crime, including the victims 
of crime. To enlarge on his statement « the crime statistics largely reflected supply 
side policies » 2 0 , the perspective he has explored may be encapsulated in the ques-
tion «what if the official data represent not the product of a free flowing, open-
ended series of criminal justice processes but merely record the output of a system 
where, despite managed appearances to the contrary, it was in fact the inputs that 
were controlled in the first place ?». 
This hypothesis is certainly challenging and fruitful, but how far has it been 
demonstrated to hold true? As to fruitfulness, for example, the hypothesis draws 
useful attention to just how little some of the inputs have been studied, and how far 
the division and re-division of criminal business between the courts was manipu-
lated. Police behaviour comes in for particular criticism; and «bureaucracy» is 
given the character of the unseen hand. Although the perspective is novel, Howard 
Taylor argues from published sources only and risks walking into the fire of the soci-
ologists' criticism of historians' naivety already mentioned in so far only, of course, 
as that criticism is valid. 
Howard Taylor has covered a wide field in a series of articles to which on this 
occasion it is not possible to respond in the same detail. Space requires selection, 
and what follows will therefore concentrate on two important limbs of his argu-
ment: the extent to which acknowledgement of crimes of murder was rationed by 
the authorities, and the extent to which the prosecution process as a whole was con-
trolled by Treasury supply. 
Howard Taylor and murder 
The argument about murder is that the numbers prosecuted were deliberately 
limited in the period 1880-1966, that is, between when the office of DPP was first 
created (before its more effective re-establishment in 1884) to the year immediately 
after the death penalty for murder was abolished. Moreover, not only were the 
numbers limited but they were limited, it is maintained, to an average of just short of 
150 a year within a range of 120 to 179: «In only five of the 104 years between 1862 
and 1966 were there either fewer than 120 murders or more than 179, i.e. the number 
1 8
 Downes, Rock (1998, p. 50). On the other hand, it has been pointed out by a criminologist that the 
« standard of statistical sophistication in criminology is not high». Pease (1999, p. xi). 
1 9
 See Note 2 above. 
2 0
 Taylor (1998a, p. 571). 
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of murders was kept within a tight band of 20 per cent (30 murders) on either side of 
the average of 150». Dismissing as esoteric the belief of Professor Terence Morris 
and Louis Blom-Cooper 2 1 that the aetiology of murder is distinct from that of other 
crimes, it is claimed that «a far more likely explanation is that prosecutions for 
murder were amongst the most strictly rationed of all crimes » 2 2 . 
This conclusion challenges what has hitherto been a fairly settled view viz. that 
the relative rarity as well as the seriousness of murder meant that it could be 
regarded as the offence whose recognised incidence was most reliably recorded in 
the police returns. As one major comparative study of trends in violent crime put it 
after reviewing the character of official records of crime: « Official records thus are 
in varying degrees inadequate for assessing the true incidence of violent offences, 
but closer to the mark for homicide than for others » 2 3 . Of course, a settled view is 
not necessarily synonymous with the truth, and the question therefore is which view 
falls to be preferred ? 
First, it must be agreed that not all homicides were then, as now, invariably dis-
covered or acknowledged. Coroners' inquests were no doubt particularly fallible 
before the availability of modern forensic and scientific capacities. It has, indeed, 
been argued that they remain fallible, and serious doubts raised on that score in 
1960s 2 4 led to the review of death certification in England and Wales undertaken by 
the Broderick Committee which reported in 1971 2 5 . Subsequent cases show on occa-
sion that there still can never be any room for complacency about the certainty of 
discovery. 
Secondly, however, examination of Howard Taylor's presentation of the 
recorded figures raises some questions about his conclusions. The first stems from 
contemplating variations of as much as 20% above and below his average annual 
rate. This suggests either a very ineffective form of control, or raises the question of 
how that degree of variation could be compatible with conscious manipulation. If 
there was manipulation, then it would have had to be of a very high degree of sophis-
tication sustained by an alliance of well over 100 separate police forces for a period 
of more than a century to keep to a pre-arranged and unchanging mark of an average 
of not more thanl50 cases a year. In the latter case, granted the highly disaggregated 
character of the criminal justice process already observed, that such a degree of 
agreement could be reached at all, still less achieved and sustained, is inherently 
implausible. 
Moreover, it is not necessary to reach for an explanation of that character when 
there is a more plausible one suggested by the figures themselves, and acknowl-
edged by Howard Taylor viz. that the variation extended by as much as 20% above 
and below the arithmetic average. This is a remarkably high degree of volatility not 
less significant for being acknowledged by Howard Taylor. In practice, it must seem 
much more likely, because of the range of incidence, that the average, far from being 
a target, can only have been an arithmetical accident devoid of anything other than 
Morris, Blom-Cooper (1964). The authors were respectively a Professor of Criminology at the 
London School of Economics and a leading criminal barrister and Queen's Counsel. 
Taylor (1998a, p.585). 
Gurr (1981,p.299). 
For example, by Havard (1960). 
Broderick Committee (1971). 
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arithmetical significance. What is significant, in other words, is not the average but 
the volatility. These points taken together, it may be judged, do not so much qualify 
Howard Taylor's interpretation as invalidate it so far as the quantitative data are con-
cerned. 
This nonetheless leaves his two other arguments: that budgetary controls at least 
inhibited or at most prevented open-ended approaches to murder prosecutions; and 
that «because the discovery of a suspicious death and its subsequent investigation 
and prosecution could make a large dent in a police authority budget, and the 
chances were that it would not be prosecuted as a murder, it was an open secret that 
most murders and suspicious deaths went uninvestigated » 2 6 . Both these assertions 
assume that contemporary financing entailed unbreakable budgetary ceilings. 
There is in fact no evidence for this. Howard Taylor has taken a Treasury 
Minister's answer to Parliament in 1889 to imply the impossibility of resort to a 
Supplementary Estimate - that is, an application to Parliament for a sum additional 
to that originally sought and granted 2 7. Further, it is far from clear from the material 
upon which he relies in connexion with the suggested manipulation of the indepen-
dent coroners' jurisdiction is capable in fact of bearing the construction that he 
places upon it. Rather, the material more convincingly demonstrates a lack of effec-
tiveness and an unacceptable degree on occasion of complacency but no conspiracy 
with the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions 2 8. 
Prosecutions 
The extent and character of budgetary control is, of course, the most important 
theme running through the whole of Dr Taylor's argument. I shall now therefore turn 
to deal with it in the context of the important points he seeks to establish about the 
2 6
 Taylor (1998a, p. 586). 
2 7
 The exchange - Official Report, Commons, 27 July 1889, column 888 - concerned whether the 
heads of departmental prosecution units were able to retain for their own use any surpluses from the 
voted monies delegated to them for managing their offices. (The reply explained, of course, that they 
could not.) There is evidence elsewhere that Supplementary Votes to defray unexpectedly high pros-
ecution costs were sought as necessary - see PP 1868-9, XLII, pp. 523-524 where the Treasury 
explained that a request for an extra £12000 (the second largest of the Supplementaries being 
sought) was necessary because an «increase has also taken place in the Amounts claimed for the 
Repayment of the Costs of Prosecution ». The Treasury Blue Book for 1880-1 reviewing the financ-
ing system for prosecutions also makes it clear that the normal Parliamentary regimes applied - T 
165/1/3 pp. 325-329. Further, the quotation (Taylor, 1998a, p.585) from an 1890 paper by the Home 
Office clerk, Grosvenor, then responsible for producing the annual criminal statistics (viz. «any 
marked variation observed from year to year are at once noted and an explanation required by offi-
cials ») does not imply that the Home Office role was exercised to keep prosecutions down rather 
than operating merely at a clerical level in checking returns and pursuing apparent discrepancies. It 
was essentially the same concerns that motivated the setting up of the Home Office committee in 
1929 to produce more uniform returns (see note 15 above) as well as other attempts down the years 
to improve the quality of the statistics. 
2 8
 The reference (Taylor 1998a, p. 587) to an anecdote in Robert Mark's memoirs seems a mistake. The 
point Mark was illustrating - Mark (1978, p. 26) - was the steps taken to pass responsibility for 
investigation of a suicide on to a neighbouring force rather than trying to prevent investigation at all. 
Such boundary deceptions to evade an unrewarding responsibility are almost certainly as old as the 
police service - see, for example, Cavanagh (1893, p. 23) and a night duty story about another officer 
in 1850s Southwark moving a drunken woman from one side of the street on to Cavanagh's side so 
that he rather than the other would lose sleep by having to take the woman before the magistrate in 
the morning after his shift. 
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prosecution system as a whole. It should first be accepted that Howard Taylor has 
somewhat modified some of the positions he took in his original thesis, and he does 
not now seek to maintain that there was an explicit regime of cash limiting in any-
thing like the modern sense. However, the ghost of that view does in some respects 
remain to haunt his argument. 
Howard Taylor hypothesises that the processing of crime in the nineteenth 
century and beyond was influenced by the manipulation of supply: «the crime sta-
tistics largely reflected supply-side policies. In this light, [he sought] to find politi-
cal explanations for two interrelated questions: first, why prosecutions stopped 
rising and, secondly, why the statistics fluctuated around such an astonishingly con-
stant average for 70 years » 2 9 . 
It is notable, however, that sometimes eye-catching assertions are balanced by 
hesitations and scrupulous reservations. For example, in his Economic History 
Review article, Treasury cash limits are claimed for 1856 and 1889 at pp. 574 and 
587, general budgets at p. 588, but more research deemed necessary at p. 574 to 
determine the full effect of Treasury parsimony, and a direct relationship between 
the size of the prosecution vote and the statistics of prosecutions thought unlikely at 
p. 577. A very considerable volatility is also displayed, if unremarked, in the data 
displayed in Figure 1. 
It is contended that these hesitations in fact indicate that it is not possible to press 
home the charge of wilful suppression. Further, it is argued that the article mistakes 
a long-running argument between local and central government about how costs 
should be shared for an argument about how often they should be incurred. Whilst it 
is undoubtedly true - as contemporaries recognised - that prosecution arrangements 
left much to be desired, there is no evidence that central government sought to 
impose overall expenditure controls, or used their powers to suppress prosecution 
rates. On this issue, the Royal Commission of 1836 was clear and never challenged: 
Any expedient founded on the principle of reducing the fair measure of com-
pensation for expense, time and trouble allowed to the prosecutor and the wit-
nesses, would, in our opinion be opposed to justice and to sound policy. The 
course of legislation on this subject has been already shown to have lain uni-
formly in the opposite direction. It seems to have been the object of the later 
enactments to give a complete remuneration to the individuals engaged in prose-
cuting crime, for the whole money, time, and labour reasonably bestowed by them 
in the performance of that public service; and we think it right and expedient that 
nothing short of this should be awarded30. 
It is not simply a question of emphasis or perspective, though the latter is impor-
tant. For example, the article offers no continuous account of the tortuous evolution 
of prosecution policy and legislation in a still limited administrative machine 3 1. Nor 
does it place the problems in other contemporary contexts, for example changing 
assumptions and disagreements about the extent to which crime control should con-
2 9
 Taylor (1998a, p. 571). 
3 0
 County Rates (1836, p. 8). 
3 1
 Oddly, the literature seems devoid of any comprehensive account. The closest approach is probably still 
Chapter 16 («Evolution of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution») in Edwards, J. L1. J. 
(1964). But this relied solely on published sources and is preoccupied more with the conduct of prose-
cutions than their initiation. Nor do other standard texts help e.g. Holdsworth (1965) or Devlin (1958). 
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tinue to be perceived as a local responsibility locally funded; and whether proce-
dural and management change at local level should be wholly optional within a 
statutory framework (the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1851, the Public 
Prosecution Bills of 1871-2) or compulsory (the Public Prosecutors Bill of 1873) 3 2. 
The article rightly highlights the evidence 3 3 of Wilmot Seton, the Treasury clerk, 
to the 1859 Royal Commission but draws questionable conclusions. For example, 
Seton made clear that from 1846 (when the Treasury assumed responsibility for 
100% of prosecution costs) local costs were paid on demand but that, following 
uncovenanted increases in local authorities' demands, from 1854 vouchers were 
required and Criminal Law Accounts Examiners were appointed to oversee the 
demands and advise on their admissibility. They maintained that the Treasury had 
often been paying costs that were entirely a local responsibility or not properly 
incurred. The result had been, the Treasury believed, «... relief to the local jurisdic-
tion far beyond the contemplation of the legislature » 3 4 . Overall, there appeared to be 
an inverse relationship between prosecution costs and the number of committals, 
especially in some Welsh counties (the Examiners calculated that universal applica-
tion of Denbigh rates would double total expenditure 3 5). 
The relevant Treasury letter books for 1858-1871 3 6 contain circumstantial expla-
nations of disallowances, sometimes offering meetings with the Examiners. (A cir-
cular was issued in 1869 summarising the Treasury criteria 3 7). Whilst it is true that 
Seton advocated paying expenses at the lowest rate, he also explained that he was 
not upheld and the Treasury endorsed the more generous allowances of the Home 
Secretary's tariff of 1858 3 8 . A single tariff was bound to create losers as well as 
winners and this was, of course, the reason for the outcry that led to the 1859 
Commission - whose majority upheld the tariff, as in effect did the 1862 Select 
Committee. The tariff stood until 1904, but at no time extended to the fees for 
counsel or attorneys which remained locally determined. 
It is relevant to bear in mind that the expenses claimed by the local authorities had 
already been disbursed by them before they applied to the Treasury for their reim-
bursement : that is, the Treasury did not take away what had already been given. Rather, 
the Treasury's aim was to secure a regime of reasonable economy: it was not, and 
Seton did not claim it was, applying a cash limit - a device first applied to criminal 
justice expenditure only in the Criminal Justice Act, 1991. As Seton saw it, the princi-
pal mischief derived from the fact that the variety of lavish fees allowed locally was « a 
natural result of the absence of interest in those who superintended the allowances in 
the general fund from which those costs were ultimately to be defrayed » 3 9 . 
3 2
 See Philips and Storch (1999) for a thorough discussion of these processes in the context of policing. 
3 3
 Taylor (1998a, pp. 574-575). 
3 4
 Prosecutions Royal Commission (1859), Evidence, Q 120. 
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 T28/74-81. 
3 7
 T28/81 - « Rules to be observed in relation to the Costs of Criminal Prosecutions which are 
repayable from the Parliamentary Grant», 17 August 1869. 
3 8
 1859,op. cit., Evidence, Q 148. See HO 347/9 for Home Secretary's Order of 9 February 1858, under 
s.5 of the statute 14&15Vic.c.55. 
3 9
 1859, op. cit., Q120. Joseph Hume, the Parliamentary apostle of administrative and financial effi-
ciency and rectitude had warned against this in 1835 - see his evidence at Q 852, County Rates 
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The friction between the Treasury and the local authorities led in 1872 to a man-
damus action brought by Lancashire to force the Treasury to pay on demand. The 
judges side-stepped the issue by maintaining that, because it related to a Vote, the 
matter could be determined only by Parliament 4 0. Private members' Bills for public 
prosecutors were introduced from 1870, just as J.G. Phillimore (the lawyer M.P. 
who chaired the 1854 and 1856 Select Committees) had introduced Bills in 1854/5. 
In response, and after extensive consultation and calculating that a compulsory, 
salaried system would not cost much more than the existing system, the Home 
Office introduced in May 1873 its own thorough-going Bill of 32 clauses and 3 
schedules which, if successful, would have put in place a regime not wholly dissim-
ilar from that finally established in 1986. There was insufficient time for the Bill to 
make progress, and the subsequent change of government resulted in a change of 
tack. From 1874 the Treasury paid full Assize costs after only local taxing, and 
settled for paying Sessions' costs at the average allowed over the previous 3 years 4 1. 
Later, as noted by the Committee in 1903 set up to review the tariff of 1858, respon-
sibility for prosecution costs were returned to the local level «in consideration of the 
Exchequer contribution grants which were made under the Local Government Act, 
1888, and which were much in excess of the Treasury payments and subventions up 
to that date» 4 2 . Finally, the 1908 Costs in Criminal Cases Act rationalised the statu-
tory lumber from 1752. 
How may the effect of all this on the number and efficiency of prosecutions be 
judged? A crucial point is that then, as now, whether a prosecution should occur at 
all was, and is, as much a subjective as an objective question. As one modern review 
of past practice has pointed out : 
... the growing willingness of the state to underwrite the costs of private prose-
cutions made prosecutions easier... of key importance in understanding prosecu-
tions is the recognition that prosecuted law breaking represented only a tiny 
proportion of similar behaviour which for various reasons never reached the 
courts43. 
Looking back from 1873 in the Home Office where he lacked enthusiasm for a 
Treasury regime based solely on a brief clause in the annual Appropriation Acts, the 
then Legal Under-Secretary (Lushington) wrote: «There is no ground for believing 
that criminal cases have, on the whole, been less effectively prosecuted since the 
system of Treasury re-taxation has been established. Quite the contrary. But in some 
instances the disallowances may have been harsh, and here and there steps necessary 
for the proper conduct of prosecution may have been omitted by prosecutors for fear 
4 0
 HO 45/9305/11932 has a copy of the judgement («...Nothing can be more anomalous, nothing can be 
more unsatisfactory, than the present system with regard to the taxation of these bills of costs...») of 
29 January 1872. The Treasury's subsequent letter of 22 April 1872, attempting to reinforce its 
regime, was greeted (minute of 27 April 1872) by the Home Office Parliamentary Under Secretary: 
«This Treasury letter is as wrong as wrong can be...The whole scheme of the Treasury is clumsy and 
irritating » (he was no doubt influenced by the mood of the debate following the judgement - Official 
Report, Commons, 15 March 1872, cols. 51-72). 
41
 Ibid., Treasury Minute of 29 January 1875. See T165/1/3, p.328, for private 1880-1 Treasury Blue 
Book recantation. 
4 2
 Prosecution allowances (1903, p. 27). 
4 3
 Davis (1989, p. 400). 
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lest the costs would be disallowed by the Treasury » 4 4 . Of course, the Home Office 
was not an entirely disinterested party, and there must have been some inhibitory 
effect even if Treasury estimates were supplemented as necessary to defray actually 
incurred local expenditure. No-one seems, however, to have regarded as satisfactory 
a situation where they were compelled to act in an environment which continued to 
find difficulty in devising adequate mechanisms for recycling resources between 
local and national levels. 
It is doubtful whether further research can establish how exactly funding 
regimes affected what is fundamentally a discretionary process. Even an early advo-
cate of more generous allowances could do no more than claim «...there is no suffi-
cient evidence to justify the assertion that there is no failure of justice...This 
assertion must always be difficult of proof under any circumstances...» - an argu-
ment which cuts both ways 4 5 . In muddling through, improvements did occur but the 
most important was the incidental effect of putting into place a permanent, paid con-
stabulary throughout the country which, without anyone planning it (though there 
was clearly Home Office encouragement) 4 6, became the public prosecutor in default 
of anyone else. Writing like Maitland in the 1880s, Stephen summarised the situa-
tion as arising from « a series of omissions on the part of the legislature to establish 
new officers for the administration of justice as the old methods of procedure grad-
ually changed their character » 4 7 . 
Extending the time frame 
This analysis has so far concentrated on the first of Howard Taylor's three recent 
articles, and now turns to look finally, and more briefly, at the two later articles 
which carry the supply side perspective further into the present century. The first of 
these deals with the rising crime statistics during 1914-1960, and the second focuses 
more narrowly on the balance between types of non-indictable crime (where motor-
ing offences eclipsed drink and similar public order offences). In both cases, the 
behaviour of the police is scrutinised with particular reference to professional self-
concern. 
The thesis of both articles is that the police chose to exercise their crime record-
ing discretion to increase the level of reported crime in order to bolster the case for 
maintaining or increasing police manpower. It is argued that this was achieved 
through the regional conference areas of chief constables where «the conference 
area was the basic statistical unit...Other evidence suggests the statistics were co-
ordinated on a national scale with such precision that they could be raised or 
lowered by the number of serving officers » 4 8 . Additionally, it is claimed that 
«Management targets appear to have been set» 4 9 . Trends towards motoring offences 
already apparent beforehand were much increased following the introduction of the 
4 4
 HO 347/11 pp. 563-612. This lengthy printed memorandum appears to have been prepared to assist 
with finalising the 1873 Bill. 
4 5
 Prosecutions Royal Commission (1859), Note of dissent by R. Upperton. 
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 Public Prosecutors (1854/5), evidence of Horatio Waddington, Home Office Permanent Under 
Secretary, Q 2072. 
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 Taylor (1999, p. 117). Similar claims are made on pp. 118, 120 and 121. 
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Road Fund in 1921 which diverted fines for motoring offences from the magistrates' 
courts to the Exchequer: «From this point of view the shift towards policing the 
motorist rather than the drunk and the vagrant was clearly in the national if not the 
local interests Moreover, there was a direct relationship between police strengths 
and motor accident figures: «In the period between 1918 and 1934 the accident 
figures appear to have been created simply by adding, year on year, an additional 
number of accidents equivalent to one sixth of the police establishment » 5 0 . 
Again, the problem with this species of argument is that it relies more than seems 
credible on supposition, and on arithmetical relationships that are more accidental 
than probative. (More generally, it may also reflect a fashionable iconoclasm about 
the administrative state to which attention has been drawn elsewhere 5 1). In a situa-
tion where there are more sufficient alternative explanations of the same phenom-
ena, there seems little reason why the supply side theories as advanced should be 
preferred, granted in addition the implausible degree of concerted conspiracy they 
posit. In a situation where the number of road vehicles increased by over 350% 
between 1920 and 1938, and road deaths ran at annual rates more than twice today's 
rates with more than forty times the 1920 number of vehicles on the road, it is not 
difficult to see why traffic increasingly took up police attention. But the data shows 
that the police had not ceased to deal with drunkenness, still less had switched away 
from it. On the contrary, after the figures for drunkenness convictions had fallen 
during 1920-1932, they rose continuously from 43 000 cases to 52 600 in 1938, the 
last fully peacetime year. In other words, as is common in the real world, change was 
not then, any more than now, an entirely linear process. 
Of course, there was much police anxiety from time to time about the service's 
increasingly prominent position in criminal justice expenditure, just as there was 
perplexity in the Home Office about trying to explain changing statistical trends and 
address awkward issues about police productivity - which one estimate has calcu-
lated as declining by over 30% 1921-1965 5 2. But the long term upward trend in 
reported crime of 5% per annum was established after the 1914-1918 War, and has 
been impervious to every vicissitude in police strength, deployment or rhetoric. The 
trend has yet clearly to change direction (the most recent figures at the time of 
writing show an increase) and the downturn of the past six years appears to have 
been corroborated by the British Crime Survey only after a delay. Stronger than pos-
sible relationships with the self-interested goals of Treasury and/or Home Office 
officials on the one hand, and police officers on the other, have been the enduring 
relationships between certain kinds of crime and the economic cycle, first in modern 
times identified by Gatrell and Hadden, and for more recent times by Simon Field 5 3. 
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Lies, damned lies, or just criminal statistics? 
Police recorded crime statistics deal in and with behaviours. In that sense, crime 
is « ultimately, a social construct. Looked at as an abstract formal category, it con-
sists of a diverse set of behaviours which have in common (perhaps only) the fact 
that they are proscribed by the criminal law» 5 4 . As Troup tried to emphasise a 
century ago, they are not facts in the same sense that court appearances and deci-
sions are facts. They reflect the experience and decisions of a multiplicity of actors 
in the interactive social process of criminal justice. They are of their time, and are 
appealed to, and employed for, the uses of that time. It follows that they will not be 
internally consistent over time. In his 1857 reforms, Redgrave constructed them so 
that they could answer to his belief in the existence of criminal classes. In the current 
age of unbelief, we look to them for data about offences at least as much as we look 
to them to explain offenders. But no more now than in the past are they to be taken 
at face value. Indeed, a former editor of the Times, no less, has sermonised: 
There are, we all know, three sorts of lie. There are statistics, crime statistics and 
police crime statistics55. 
Nonetheless, the criminal statistics are incontestably the most profuse and the 
most accessible data available. They are, therefore, to be taken seriously for what 
they aire, that is artefacts of contemporary social processes. To inquire whether they 
share the characteristics of observations of the physical universe, say, is less impor-
tant than to establish what they mean and what they tell us about the human universe 
that created them. For that enterprise, the historian and the sociologist need each 
other, and both need the statistician. 
Howard Taylor's articles ask new questions about the data, and his approach 
does a great deal to challenge views which may have become too settled and com-
fortable. Whatever may be said about the detail of his argument - and, to draw on a 
road traffic analogy, it risks looking very like hit and run history at times - it is an 
argument abundantly worth having. 
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